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Watering Down the Clean Water Act:  
A Critique of the NPDES Water Transfers Rule  
David Eng  
INTRODUCTION 
On June 4, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit in Friends of the 
Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District
1
 held that 
the transfer of water by pumping contaminated water from drainage 
canals
2
 into an upstream lake used for drinking water was not subject 
to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (―NPDES‖) 
permit program under section 402 of the Clean Water Act (―CWA‖ 
or the ―Act‖).3 The lake, known as Lake Okeechobee (―Lake‖), ―is 
the second largest freshwater lake within the continental United 
 
  
 J.D. (2011), Washington University School of Law; B.A., Political Science (2005), 
Amherst College. The author would like to thank Min Fang for her endless love and support; it 
is to her this work is dedicated. 
 1. Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 
2009).  
 2. Id. at 1214. These drainage canals contain rainwater and runoff from agricultural, 
industrial and residential areas. Id. Designated as Class III waters, the waters in these canals 
contained a ―loathsome concoction‖ of pollutants including nitrogen, phosphorous, total 
suspended solids, dissolved solids, low quantities of dissolved oxygen, and un-ionized 
ammonia. Id.; Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-80309 Civ., 2006 
WL 3635465, at *14, *19 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2006) (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-
302.400 (2006)). In contrast, Florida has designated Lake Okeechobee as a Class I water body, 
or potable water supply. Id. The biological differences between Lake Okeehobee and the canals 
are considered ―severe.‖ Id. at *20–21. 
 3. See Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1214, 1228. The Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006), makes the ―discharge of any pollutant‖ by any person unlawful, 
except in compliance with specified provisions of the Act. Id. § 1311(a). The Act defines 
―discharge of any pollutant‖ as ―any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any 
point source.‖ Id. § 1362(12) (emphasis added). Section 402 of the Act specifically authorizes 
the NPDES permit program, and the program is codified into two sections of the United States 
Code: section 1311, which describes effluent limitations, and section 1342(a)(1), which sets out 
the overall structure of the permit program.  
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States,‖4 and it is separated from drainage canals by the Herbert 
Hoover Dike (―Dike‖).5 At issue in Friends were the pump stations 
built into the Dike that were used to ―backpump‖ the polluted waters 
from the canal into the Lake for flood control or water supply 
purposes.
6
 To enjoin the South Florida Water Management District 
(―Water District‖) from pumping the canal waters into the Lake, the 
Friends plaintiffs-appellees sued the Water District, contending that 
the water transfers constituted an ―addition‖ of regulated pollutants 
that triggered the NPDES permit requirement.
7
 The Friends 
plaintiffs-appellees therefore argued that the Water District would 
have to obtain an NPDES permit before conducting the water 
transfers.
8
  
In finding that water transfers did not constitute an ―addition‖ 
under the CWA, the Friends court reasoned that the statutory 
language was ambiguous and, therefore, gave Chevron deference to a 
recent interpretation of the NPDES provision by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (―EPA‖).9 Specifically, on June 
 
 4. Friends of the Everglades, 2006 WL 3635465, at *7; see also CAROL GREGWARE, 
GUIDE TO THE LAKE OKEECHOBEE AREA, at vii (1997); Water Management Projects, S. FLA. 
WATER MGMT. DISTRICT, https://my.sfwmd.gov/portal/page/ portal/sfwmdmain/regions (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 5. The Hoover Dike is a ―27 to 42-foot high, and up to 300-foot wide barrier that 
physically separates the Lake from the lands surrounding the lake.‖ Friends of the Everglades, 
2006 WL 3635465, at *8; see also Herbert Hoover Dike: Facts & Information, U.S. ARMY 
CORPS OF ENG‘RS, JACKSONVILLE DIST., http://www.saj.usace.army.mil/Divisions/Everglades/ 
Branches/HHDProject/DOCS/HHD_facts.PDF (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 6. Friends of the Everglades, 2006 WL 3635465, at *13–15. 
 7. See Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1221. The Friends court, at the outset, 
determined that: (1) the pump stations were ―point sources‖; (2) the Lake and the drainage 
canals are ―navigable waters‖; and (3) that the waters transferred from the polluted canal to the 
Lake contains ―pollutants‖ within the meaning of the CWA. Id. at 1216 (citing S. Fla. Water 
Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102, 105 (2004)). See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362 (2006) for the definitions of these terms within the CWA.  
 8. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1221. 
 9. Id. at 1217–28. Courts have used the term ―Chevron deference‖ to articulate the 
administrative deference doctrine set by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court set forth the legal 
test for determining whether to grant deference to a government agency‘s interpretation of its 
own statutory mandate. Id. at 843–44. The Chevron decision created a two-part analysis (called 
the ―Chevron two-step test‖), where a reviewing court determines: (1) Whether the statute is 
ambiguous or there is a gap that Congress intended the agency to fill, and (2) if so, whether the 
agency‘s interpretation of a statute is reasonable or permissible. See id. If an agency‘s 
interpretation is reasonable, then the court will defer to the agency‘s reading of the statute. Id.  
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13, 2008, the EPA promulgated the final NPDES Water Transfers 
Rule (―Final Rule‖) for public review.10 The Final Rule exempts 
―water transfers‖ from the requirements of the NPDES permit 
program.
11
 Under the Final Rule, transferring water between waters 
of the United States does not require a permit,
12 
unless the transferred 
water will be used for industrial, municipal, or commercial uses, or 
unless the water transfer involved a conveyance or point source that, 
by itself,
13
 introduces new pollutants into the receiving water body.
14
 
Because the water transfers in Friends fell within the Final Rule‘s 
exemptions, the Friends court reversed the district court‘s holding, 
and ruled that the Water District did not have to obtain an NPDES 
permit.
15
 
The Eleventh Circuit‘s holding and its deference to the Rule leave 
a gaping hole in the ―comprehensive regulatory regime‖ established 
by Congress under the Clean Water Act.
16
 Without the benefit of a 
NPDES permit process in most water transfers, water bodies with 
fragile and unique vegetative and wildlife habitats like those in Lake 
 
 10. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 
Fed. Reg. 33,697 (June 13, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i)). 
 11. Id. at 33,704. Historically, in administering the CWA, EPA generally did not require 
NPDES permits for water transfers. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
Water Transfers Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887, 32,891 (proposed June 7, 2006); 
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 102, 107. However, prior to 2005, EPA had not formally articulated its 
policy regarding water transfers in any administrative document. Catskill Mountains Chapter of 
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 273 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Miccosukee, 
541 U.S. at 107–08 (noting that EPA had espoused conflicting views regarding water transfers 
on occasions). 
 12. ―Waters of the United States‖ are defined for purposes of the NPDES permitting 
program in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2000). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006) (defining ―navigable 
waters‖ to mean the waters of the United States).  
 13. Under the CWA, a point source is ―any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, 
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure . . . 
from which pollutants are or may be discharged.‖ 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006). 
 14. See NPDES Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,699-700 (providing examples of 
various water transfer scenarios that would be exempted from the NPDES permitting program). 
This definition of water transfers reflects what is sometimes referred to as the ―unitary water 
theory‖ of navigable waters. See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105–07. Under the unitary waters 
theory, all navigable waters should be considered a singular entity, rather than separate entities 
or individual bodies of water. Therefore, transferring pollution from one navigable water to 
another does not ―add‖ to the pollution. However, an addition will occur when pollutants ―first 
enter navigable waters from a point source.‖ See Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1217.  
 15. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1228. 
 16. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 99, 101 (1992). 
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Okeechobee may be destroyed by unregulated water transfers. This 
Note analyzes the Final Rule‘s consonance with the goal of the 
CWA, and more specifically, with the purpose of the NPDES 
program.  
Part I of this Note describes the significant role water transfers 
play in the United States. Part II uncovers the political, economic, 
cultural, and environmental landscape that gave rise to the enactment 
of the CWA and, particularly, the NPDES permit program under 
section 402 of the CWA. Because the interpretation of ―addition‖ as 
it relates to water transfers has been highly contested in courts well 
before the promulgation of the Final Rule, Part III discusses this case 
law, as well as EPA‘s preliminary interpretation prior to the Final 
Rule. Part IV describes EPA‘s rationale for the Final Rule. Part V 
contends that EPA‘s interpretation of ―addition‖ is unreasonable, 
because it ignores the delicate balance between environmental 
concerns and state sovereignty concerns Congress sought to resolve 
when enacting the CWA and its amendments. Part VI posits that an 
interpretation that would best achieve the legislative purpose of 
section 402 of the CWA would be one that defines ―addition‖ as any 
discharge from a point source from one ―meaningfully distinct‖ 
navigable water to another ―meaningfully distinct‖ navigable water.17  
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF WATER TRANSFERS 
Thousands of water transfers exist across the United States in 
many different contexts.
18
 Generally, water transfers divert water 
containing pollutants from one navigable water to another through 
natural or man-made conveyances, such as tunnels, channels, and 
streams.
19
 Some are as simple as moving a small quantity of water a 
short distance. Others can be as complex as reallocating water from 
 
 17. This interpretation of section 402 of the CWA was also raised by the United States 
Supreme Court in Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95. Miccosukee was decided prior to the promulgation 
of the Final Rule, and hence, Chevron deference was not an issue in that case. Id. at 95–105. 
 18. Lawrence R. Liebesman & Steve Kelton, Comment, Clean Water Act NPDES Water 
Transfer Issue: The Implications for the Water Supply and Water User Communities, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10181, 10189 (2009). 
 19. NPDES Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,698. Water transfers either pump or 
passively direct water for uses such as providing drinking water, irrigation, power generation, 
flood control, and environmental restoration. Id.  
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multiple reservoirs and transporting substantial quantities of water 
over long distances, across both state and basin boundaries.
20
  
An NPDES permit requirement for water transfers provokes much 
controversy ―because many of the United States‘ major metropolitan 
areas—including Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York City, and 
Denver—rely on interbasin transfer water for a large percentage of 
their municipal water supply.‖21 Requiring an NPDES permit for 
every instance of water transfer that currently takes place across the 
United States burdens many water suppliers because the NPDES 
permit process can be time consuming, and ―compliance 
tremendously costly.‖22 Yet thirteen states have requested EPA‘s 
permanent withdrawal of the Final Rule and supported the 
requirement for an NPDES permit for water transfers.
23
  
 
 20. Id.; see also Peter D. Nichols, Miccosukee: The Potential for Clean Water Act 
Discharge Permits for Water Transfers, 33 COLO. LAW. 119, 121 (2004).  
 21. Jeremy N. Jungreis & Robert C. Horton, Awash in Controversy: The Developing Saga 
of the EPA Water Transfers Rule, 40 A.B.A. TRENDS 6 (2008). In the arid west, water transfers 
are becoming more common because water that has been traditionally allocated for irrigation is 
being transferred to ―growing cities [that] can no longer secure additional supplies through 
surface supply augmentation or ground water pumping.‖ COMM. ON WESTERN WATER MGMT 
ET AL., NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16 (1992); see also Sara Colangelo, Comment, Transforming Water 
Transfers: The Evolution Of Water Transfer Case Law And The NPDES Water Transfers 
Proposed Rule, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107, 109 (2008) (describing how the nation‘s demanding 
need for limited water resources prompts the use of water transfers as a device to reallocate 
waters); Kevin Haskins, Note, A ―Delicate Balance”: How Agency Nonacquiescence and the 
EPA’s Water Transfer Rule Dilute the Clean Water Act After Catskill Mountains Chapter of 
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 60 ME. L. REV. 173 (2008).  
 22. Jungreis & Horton, supra note 21, at 6.  
 23. See N.Y. ATT‘Y GEN. ET AL., COMMENTS ON EPA PROPOSED RULE CONCERNING THE 
APPLICABILITY OF NPDES PERMITS TO INTER-BASIN TRANSFERS OF WATER CONTAINING 
POLLUTANTS 9–10 (2006), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/news/files/EPARule.pdf 
(noting that ―[s]tates have a strong interest in ensuring a strong ‗national floor‘ of water quality 
controls through the Act‘s permitting requirement,‖ and moreover, because ―watersheds do not 
respect political boundaries, downstream [s]tates have a substantial interest in protecting their 
water bodies through the uniform processes and remedies provided by the Act against the 
transfer of pollutants originating in upstream [s]tates‖).  
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II. HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE NPDES PROVISION 
The U.S. Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972,
24
 now commonly referred to as the Clean 
Water Act, after finding that previous water pollution control laws 
were grossly ineffective. Therefore, the CWA established an 
ambitious objective of ―restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.‖25 Towards 
that end, Congress prohibited discharges of pollutants into the 
nation‘s waters unless a discharger complies with permit 
requirements.
26
 The NPDES permit program became one of the 
primary vehicles to accomplish that national goal.
27
  
 
 24. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 
86 Stat. 896 (1972), amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 5(a), 91 Stat. 
1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006)). The final version of the Clean 
Water Act was vetoed by President Richard M. Nixon, but the House and Senate overrode the 
veto. PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
POLLUTION 173 (1991).  
 25. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). The CWA had its origins in the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (―FWPCA‖), Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). See generally 2 WILLIAM 
H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 252 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the passage of the 1948 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act). The FWPCA empowered federal agencies to support 
states in providing for water pollution control activities, and thus the federal role was merely 
advisory. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1–2 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668-70; PAUL 
CHARLES MILAZZO, UNLIKELY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: CONGRESS AND CLEAN WATER, 1945–
1972, at 142–45 (2006). Subsequent amendments to the FWPCA broadened the federal 
government‘s authority in water pollution control. See, e.g., Clean Water Restoration Act of 
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966) (imposing fine on polluters); Water Quality Act 
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (setting water quality standards which are 
state and federally enforceable and mandating a water quality assessment program); Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204 (1961) 
(providing for an abatement suit at the request of a state environmental pollution agency). 
 Despite the original FWPCA and amendments following the Act‘s passage, water quality 
remained well below applicable standards, and enforcement of the standards was nearly 
nonexistent. BEATRICE HORT HOLMES, HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS 
AND POLICIES 190–93 (1979); MILAZZO, supra, at 142–45; DAVID ZWICK & MARCY 
BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 271–280 (1971). 
 26. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1344 (2006); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 70 (1971), 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3738 (noting that the permit program is the ―most effective 
control mechanism‖). 
 27. Colangelo, supra note 21, at 114 (citing Richard Konkoly-Thege, Addition of a 
Pollutant and Division of a Natural Body of Water: Should There be a New Math for NPDES 
Permits Under the Clean Water Act?, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 787, 802 (2005)). Congress also 
created a comprehensive permitting program for dredge or fill activities—as distinct from point 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Watering Down the Clean Water Act 185 
 
 
Importantly, the NPDES permit program stemmed from the 
permit program first established under the 1899 Refuse Act.
28
 In 
enacting the NPDES provision, Congress acknowledged that the 
previous permit program was weak in that it only applied to industrial 
polluters, and that the authority was divided between two federal 
agencies.
29
 Therefore, the CWA not only restructured the authority 
for water pollution control and consolidated authority in the 
Administrator of the EPA, but revamped the focus of previous 
enforcement from regulating the amount of pollutants in a given body 
of water to regulating effluent limitations.
30
 This change prevented 
dischargers from releasing pollutants into waters in the hope that 
mere dilution without affecting ambient water quality would prevent 
the triggering of federal regulation.
31
 
Despite the new focus on effluent limitations, the NPDES permit 
program still took into account the receiving water quality in 
determining the appropriate restrictions on discharges at their 
source.
32
 If ―the application of effluent limitations under [the NPDES 
 
source discharges under the NPDES permit program—under section 404 of the CWA. 33 
U.S.C. § 1344. 
 28. Sarah Slack, Note, When Is a Pesticide Not a Pollutant? Never: An Analysis of the 
EPA’s Misguided Guidance, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1241, 1247 (2005). See generally Jason R. Jones, 
Comment, The Clean Water Act: Groundwater Regulation and the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 93, 96 (1999) (noting that the 
Refuse Act, which amended the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, gave the Secretary of the 
Army the power to issue permits regulating discharges).  
 29. Slack, supra note 28, at 1247.  
 30. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 5); see D. Brennen Keene, Comment, The 
Inconsistency of Virginia’s Execution of the NPDES Permit Program: The Foreclosure of 
Citizen Attorneys General from State and Federal Courts, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 715, 718–19 
(1995). An ―effluent limitation‖ is ―any restriction established by a State or the Administrator 
on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents 
which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters.‖ Clean Water Act § 502(11), 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2006). Section 301(e) of the Act requires that ―[e]ffluent limitations 
established pursuant to this section or [Section 302 of the Act] shall be applied to all point 
sources of discharges of pollutants in accordance with the provisions of this Act.‖ 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(e) (2006). Regulations implementing § 301(e) of the Act are known as effluent 
limitation guidelines, which EPA has published at 40 C.F.R. §§ 401–71 (2008).  
 31. See RODGERS, supra note 25, at 259. For a general discussion of the operation of the 
NPDES program, see David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act, 34 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 267, 296–300 (2009). 
 32. Amy E. Fortenberry, Comment, Moving Violations: Violations of the Clean Water Act 
and Implications for CERCLA’s Federally Permitted Release Exception, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 821, 826 (1997). 
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program] . . . would interfere with the attainment or maintenance of 
that water quality,‖ the NPDES program provided that alternative 
effluent control strategies be employed.
33
  
In 1977, the U.S. Congress amended the CWA, adding, among 
other provisions, section 101(g) to underscore the state‘s primary 
authority in the water allocation business.
34
 The amendments were 
followed by a 1978 EPA memorandum stating that the amendments 
did not prohibit EPA from taking actions required to protect water 
quality of the nation‘s waters even if such actions incidentally 
affected state water rights and state usages of water.
35
  
Under the current NPDES program, EPA's regulations provide for 
two types of permits that it can grant after a hearing: individual and 
general permits.
36
 As the designations imply, the EPA grants 
individual permits to specific facilities for specific discharges.
37
 
Similarly, general permits are granted to categories of similar point 
sources that have common components, such as location and type of 
discharge.
38
 
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF ―ADDITION‖ PRIOR TO FINAL RULE 
Pennsylvania has required NPDES permits for water transfers 
since 1986. This was the result of a holding by the Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania in Del-AWARE Unlimited v. Department of 
Environmental Resources,
39
 in which the court upheld a ruling by the 
 
 33. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (2006). Effluent limitations under the NPDES program were a 
means to an end. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit noted that 
―the primary purpose of effluent limitations‖ is to ensure ―uniformity among federal and state 
jurisdictions enforcing NPDES.‖ 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Thus, it makes sense 
that the NPDES provision in CWA § 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312, provides an alternative to effluent 
limitations in circumstances where enforcing effluent limitations may be counterintuitive, such 
as with water transfers.  
 34. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (1977). 
 35. Memorandum from Thomas Dorling, Assistant Adm‘r for Water & Waste Mgmt., to 
Reg‘l Adm‘rs, on State Authority to Allocate Water Quantities—Section 101(g) of the Clean 
Water Act (Nov. 7, 1978), available at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/ 
upload/1999_11_03_standards_waterquantities.pdf. 
 36. See EPA Administered Permit Programs: The National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. § 122.28 (2004). 
 37. Id. § 122.21. 
 38. Id. § 122.28. 
 39. Del-AWARE Unlimited, Inc. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Res., 508 A.2d 348 (Pa. Commw. 
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state‘s Environmental Hearing Board finding that a diversion of 
water from a river to two nearby streams through a pump station 
required an NPDES permit.
40
 As a result of the ruling, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection issued a 
Policy for Permitting Surface Water Diversions, which specified 
factors considered in issuing NPDES permits.
41
 It took into account 
two basic factors: ―(1) the designated uses of the receiving stream 
and the water quality criteria necessary to protect those uses, and (2) 
the effluent quality necessary to meet established water quality 
criteria or minimum treatment requirement in order to protect 
designated stream uses.‖42  
Prior to the Final Rule, federal courts have also broached the issue 
of whether water transfers fell within the NPDES permitting 
provision.
43
 In 1982, the D.C. Circuit in National Wildlife Federation 
v. Gorsuch
44
 considered whether adverse water quality changes 
caused by the release of polluted water through a dam into a 
downstream river required an NPDES permit.
45
 Although cognizant 
 
1986). 
 40. Id. at 351, 354–56. In Del-AWARE Unlimited, the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania did not face the issue of whether the water diversion constituted an ―addition‖ 
under section 402 of the CWA. See id. at 348–60. Neither party raised the issue, and the dispute 
focused on the meaning of ―point source‖ under section 402 of the CWA and how the term 
related to the diversion of water from one water body to another water body. See id. The Del-
AWARE Unlimited court seemingly assumed that there was an ―addition‖ based on the fact 
there were two separate water bodies in question. See id. at 359. The court found that an 
NPDES permit was required for the diversion because the pipes used to divert the water 
constituted a point source. Id. 
 41. PA. DEP‘T OF ENVTL. PROT., BUREAU OF WATER QUALITY PROT., POLICY FOR 
PERMITTING SURFACE WATER DIVERSIONS 8–10 (1998), available at http://www.elibrary. 
dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Version-48796/362-2000-003.pdf [hereinafter POLICY GUIDE].  
 42. Id. at 8. In addition to the two factors, the Policy Guide also specified that in assessing 
the water quality impact of a proposed water transfer, the parameters to be evaluated should 
include temperature and levels of ammonia, dissolved oxygen, bioassay-based metals and 
phosphate. Id. at 10. Moreover, the Policy Guide specified consideration for impacts to aquatic 
life in conjunction with toxicity testing and other biological assessment techniques. Id. at 11.  
 43. See, e.g., Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 273 
F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996); Nat‘l Wildlife Fed‘n 
v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988); Nat‘l Wildlife Fed‘n v. Gorsuch, 693 
F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  
 44. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156. 
 45. Id. at 165. The adverse water quality changes related to low dissolved oxygen, 
temperature changes, nutrients, sediments, and super saturation. Id. at 161. The parties disputed 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 36:179 
 
 
of the water quality issues caused by dams, defendant EPA argued 
that for there to be an ―addition of a pollutant from a point source to 
occur, the point source must introduce a pollutant into navigable 
water from the outside world,‖ and that ―merely pass[ing]‖ water 
from one body of navigable water to another did not trigger the 
NPDES permit requirement.
46
 After an extensive exegesis of the 
CWA's statutory text, structure, and legislative history, the D.C. 
Circuit held that EPA‘s interpretation of the NPDES permit program 
as excluding dam-caused pollution was ―reasonable, not inconsistent 
with congressional intent and entitled to great deference.‖47  
Six years later, the Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion. In 
National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co.,
48
 the Sixth 
Circuit considered whether water transfers from a hydropower 
facility that pumped water from a lake to a reservoir and then 
released the water back to generate electricity triggered the NPDES 
permit provision.
49
 The Sixth Circuit agreed with Gorsuch and 
deferred to EPA‘s position that an NPDES permit was not required.50 
The court noted that ―Congress apparently intended that pollution 
problems caused by dams and other flow diversion facilities are 
generally to be regulated by means other than the NPDES permit 
program.‖51  
 
whether these constituted ―pollutants,‖ and if so, whether these pollutants were ―additions‖ that 
required a NPDES permit. Id. at 165.  
 46. Id. at 165. 
 47. Id. at 183. The Gorsuch court found that the language of the statute was ambiguous as 
it relates to water transfers. Id. at 175. Turning to the legislative history, it found that Congress 
was focused on regulating ―traditional industrial and municipal wastes‖ when it enacted the 
NPDES permitting provision, so thus never considered the regulation of facilities such as dams 
under section 402. Id. Additionally, the Gorsuch court concluded that Congress probably did 
not consider the regulation of dams because such water transfers were not amenable to the 
technological controls, such as effluent limitations, required for point sources under the NPDES 
permit program. Id. Lastly, the court reasoned that had Congress wanted to apply the NPDES 
program wherever feasible, ―it could easily have chosen suitable language, e.g., all pollution 
released through a point source,‖ instead of limiting the application of the NPDES program to 
the ―‗addition‘ of ‗pollutants‘ ‗from‘ a point source.‖ Id. at 176.  
 48. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580. 
 49. Id. at 581. During the diversion of water, the hydropower facility caused some fish 
and other aquatic organisms to be entrained into the pumps, chopped up, and then subsequently 
discharged back to the lake. Id. at 582–83.  
 50. Id. at 590. 
 51. Id. at 587. 
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In 1996, the First Circuit in Dubois v. United States Department of 
Agriculture
52
 held that the transfer of pollutants from a river to a 
pond required an NPDES permit.
53
 In Dubois, a ski resort operator 
drew water for snowmaking from a relatively pristine pond used for 
drinking water and from a nearby river.
54
 After the combined waters 
were pumped through the snowmaking system, they were disposed 
back into the pond.
55
 Evidence showed that the combined water 
introduced into the pond contained bacteria, oil, grease, phosphorus, 
turbidity, heat, and other aquatic organisms, such as Giardia 
lambia,
56
 not previously present in the pond waters.
57
 The Dubois 
court held that the transfer of polluted water from one water body to a 
distinct water body constituted an ―addition‖ of pollutants to the 
receiving water body.
58
 
In 2001, the Second Circuit in Catskill Mountains Chapter of 
Trout Unlimited v. City of New York
59
 held that the transfer of 
drinking water from a reservoir to a premier trout fishing creek 
through a water tunnel qualifies as an ―addition.‖60 The court found 
that although the water bodies were hydrologically connected,
61
 the 
tunnel changed the directional flow and gravity as waters from the 
reservoir under natural conditions would never reach the creek.
62
 As a 
 
 52. Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 53. Id. at 1299. 
 54. Id. at 1277–78. 
 55. Id. at 1278. 
 56. This parasite causes ―giardiasis,‖ a diarrheal illness. Giardia, CDC, http://www.cdc. 
gov/parasites/giardia (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
 57. Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1277–78.  
 58. Id. at 1296–97. The court emphasized that river water and pond water, for all relevant 
purposes, were distinct. Although water naturally flowed from the pond into the river, water 
would never naturally flow from the river to the pond. Id. at 1297. That difference, along with 
the vast difference in water quality between the two water bodies, made the pumping an 
―addition.‖ Id. at 1297–99. Furthermore, the court distinguished Gorsuch and Consumers 
Power as involving the accumulation of the same water or the movement of water within the 
same water body. Id. at 1299. 
 59. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 273 F.3d 481 (2d 
Cir. 2001).  
 60. Id. at 489. The plaintiff alleged that the tunnel discharges pollutants in the form of 
―suspended solids,‖ ―turbidity,‖ and heat into the creek and that the discharges caused the creek 
to ―violate state water quality standards for turbidity and temperature.‖ Id. at 485. 
 61. Id. at 484. The waters were hydrologically connected because they both flowed into 
the Hudson River. Id.  
 62. Id. The Catskill court found that the reservoir waters were diverted south through the 
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result, the Second Circuit concluded that ―[n]o one can reasonably 
argue that the water in the [reservoir] and the [creek] are in any sense 
the ‗same.‘‖63 Persuaded by the ordinary meaning of the word 
―addition‖ to encompass circumstances where water is moved from 
one ―discrete‖ water body to another, the Second Circuit held that the 
water transfer was an ―addition‖ that required an NPDES permit.64  
In 2004, the Supreme Court in South Florida Water Management 
District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians examined facts and issues 
similar to the ones in Friends.
65
 The Miccosukee plaintiffs alleged 
that an NPDES permit was required for the pumping of stormwater 
runoffs with elevated levels of phosphorous into an water 
conservation area in the Florida Everglades that is naturally low in 
phosphorous.
66
 The Miccosukee Court considered whether water 
transfers were an ―addition‖ that required a NPDES permit,67 and 
noting that the EPA had not fully articulated its position regarding 
 
tunnel for several miles and released into the creek. Id. Absent the tunnel, the reservoir water 
would flow north and eventually make its way into the Hudson River. Id. On the other hand, 
water from the creek would naturally make its way southeast to the Hudson River by way of 
another reservoir. Id. 
 63. Id. at 492. 
 64. Id. at 489, 493–94. The Second Circuit brushed aside EPA‘s informal policy papers 
which declared that NPDES permits should not be required for dam releases because they are 
not considered ―discharges‖ under the CWA. Id. at 490. The court found that EPA‘s policy was 
never formalized in a notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, and thus the 
policy was entitled to less deference. Id. at 490–91 (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 
U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).  
 65. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). 
 66. Id. at 100–02. The plaintiffs argued that the phosphorous from the runoffs alters the 
balance of the water conservation area‘s ecosystem by ―stimulat[ing] the growth of algae and 
plants foreign to the [] ecosystem.‖ Id. at 101. Beginning in the early 1900s up until today, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the predecessors to the Water District have constructed an 
immense system of water control and diversion facilities, canals, and levees in the Florida 
Everglades. Colangelo, supra note 21, at 122–23. Currently the canals and dikes created by this 
project redirect 1.7 billion gallons of water each day out of the Everglades through 1,400 miles 
of canals, levees, and dikes, 125 water control structures, and 18 pumping stations. Id. (citing 
CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS 
AND CASES 104 (2005); Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Protecting and Preserving Our National Parks: 
The Everglades National Park Restoration Project, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 136 (2000)). 
Pollutants from agricultural and urban runoff have degraded the waters of the Florida 
Everglades, and thereby has ―drastically reduc[ed] the abundance of birds and wildlife.‖ 
Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 
1013. For a history of the Everglades and a description of its ecology, see Konkoly-Thege, 
supra note 27, at 789–93.  
 67. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105–06.  
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this issue at that time and that some factual issues remain unresolved, 
remanded the case for further fact-finding.
68
 Specifically, the Court 
wanted to know whether the two waters in question were 
―meaningfully distinct,‖ although the Court did not define the term.69 
Ultimately, the Court agreed that if the two waters were not in fact 
meaningfully distinct, then no NPDES permit would be required.
70
  
In 2005, EPA first responded to the Miccosukee remand by 
issuing a preliminary agency interpretation of ―addition‖ within 
section 402 of the CWA.
71
 EPA concluded that a water transfer is not 
an ―addition‖ that would potentially subject it to the NPDES 
permitting requirements.
72
 EPA then expressed its intent to codify 
their interpretation through the rulemaking process.
73
 However, in 
light of the Miccosukee Court‘s holding, EPA also noted that if it 
were required to make a factual determination as to whether a 
waterbody is ―meaningfully distinct,‖ it would undertake a two-part 
test.
74
 Specifically, this test must determine whether the waters are 
distinct,
75
 and whether the distinction between them is meaningful.
76
 
 
 68. Id. at 111–12.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. However, the Court declined to resolve the question of whether water transfers 
require NPDES permits when the water bodies at issue are in fact meaningfully distinct. Id.  
 71. Memorandum from Ann R. Klee, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, and 
Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Adm‘r for Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional 
Administrators, Agency Interpretation on Applicability of Section 402 of the Clean Water Act 
to Water Transfers 2 (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/ogc/documents/water 
_transfers.pdf [hereinafter 2005 EPA Memorandum].  
 72. The 2005 EPA Memorandum contains the same argument for exempting water 
transfers under the NPDES permitting program as in the Final Rule. Id. 
 73. Id. at 19. 
 74. Id. at 15.  
 75. Id. To determine whether waters are ―distinct,‖ EPA argued that the analysis must 
determine whether there is a natural or man-made hydrological connection between the two 
water bodies. Id. at 15–16. The 2005 EPA Memorandum noted that a water transfer rule 
adopting the ―meaningfully distinct‖ test may include water bodies that are man-made changes 
in the normal flow or surface and ground waters because Congress has acknowledged that the 
nation‘s waters have been extensively altered by human activity for centuries. Id. Further, the 
provisions of the CWA has been applied to ―all waters that meet the statutory and regulatory 
definitions of navigable waters, regardless of whether human activity may have contributed to 
making the water what it is today.‖ Id. at 15. 
 76. Id. To determine whether waters are ―meaningfully‖ distinct, EPA posits that the 
analysis must determine whether the water transfers would have a ―meaningful, or significant, 
adverse effect on water quality that is not being adequately addressed by States and water 
resource management agencies.‖ Id. at 17. This meant that the requirement for a NPDES permit 
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IV. EPA‘S RATIONALE FOR THE FINAL WATER TRANSFERS RULE 
On June 13, 2008, EPA promulgated the Final Rule, which set 
aside the two-part test in favor of categorically exempting all water 
transfers that fall under the Final Rule‘s definition.77 EPA justified its 
interpretation by examining the Act‘s statutory language and 
structure, and pointed out multiple provisions of the CWA which 
leave primary oversight of water transfers to state water resource 
management agencies and state non-NPDES authorities.
78
  
According to EPA, both sections 101(g) and 510(2) of the CWA 
stood for the proposition that Congress made clear ―the [Act] is to be 
construed in a manner that does not unduly interfere with the ability 
of States to allocate water within their boundaries.‖79 EPA then cited 
section 101(b) for the proposition that states have primary 
responsibilities with respect to the development of land and water 
resources.
80
 Finally, EPA cited section 304(f) for the proposition that 
Congress foresaw that water transfers could result in pollution but it 
chose to regulate certain water transfers or flow diversions through 
dams, levees, and channels outside of the NPDES program, insofar as 
 
for water transfers may consider ―whether there are existing laws, regulations, or programs that 
are being implemented that adequately address the types of water quality concerns associated 
with the water transfer at issue.‖ Id. Conversely, where authorities are not being implemented to 
address the water quality concerns, EPA believed that other factors should be considered in 
determining whether a water transfer concerns ―meaningfully‖ distinct water bodies. Id. One 
possible factor may include ―the degree of similarity or differences between the waters,‖ such 
as the ―differences between the chemical, physical and biological characteristics‖ of the water 
bodies at issue. Id. at 17–18. 
 77. NPDES Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33, 697 (June 13, 2008) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 122.3(i)). Noting that the term ―addition‖ is a general term, undefined by the statute, 
EPA turned to statutory construction principles to construe the meaning of the term. Id. at 
33,700–01. First, the EPA took a ―holistic‖ approach to the statute by viewing the provision in 
the context of the whole law, its objectives, and policy. Id. (citing United States v. Boisdore‘s 
Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850)). Above all, EPA reasoned that ―the heart of this matter is the 
balance Congress created between federal and State oversight of activities affecting the nation‘s 
waters.‖ Id.  
 78. Id. at 33,701–03. 
 79. Id. at 33,704. Specifically, section 101(g) states that ―[i]t is the policy of Congress that 
the authority of each state to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be 
superseded, abrogated, or otherwise impaired by [the Act].‖ Section 510(2) provides that 
―[e]xcept as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall . . . be construed as 
impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the 
waters (including boundary waters) of such States.‖ Id. 
 80. Id. at 33,702.  
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these transfers or diversions do not involve discharges from point 
sources.
81
  
Taking these four statutory provisions in conjunction, EPA, in 
effect, framed water transfers as an issue solely related to water 
management or allocation rather than water quality.
82
 EPA then 
concluded that Congress could neither have intended to create federal 
interference with state authority over water allocation and 
management, nor intended to create federal oversight of water 
transfers under the NPDES program.
83
 Finally, EPA distinguished 
water transfers from NPDES discharges because all NPDES 
discharges are subject to effluent limitations
84
 and, since operators of 
water diversion facilities are not generally responsible for the 
presence of the pollutants in the waters they transfer, the effluent 
limitations applied to all NPDES discharges will be inapplicable.  
EPA also discussed the legislative history of the CWA sections it 
cited to support its interpretation. It noted that the legislative history 
of section 101(g) reveals that ―[i]t is the purpose of this [provision] to 
insure that State [water] allocation systems are not subverted.‖85 
Additionally, EPA argued that ―the legislative history of the Act 
 
 81. See id. Section 304(f)(2)(F) of the CWA directs EPA to ―issue guidelines for 
identifying and evaluating the nature and extent of nonpoint sources of pollution, as well as 
processes, procedures and methods to control pollution [resulting] from, among other things, 
‗changes in the movement, flow or circulation of any navigable waters or ground waters, 
including changes caused by the construction of dams, levees, channels, causeways, or flow 
diversion facilities.‘‖ Id. EPA reasoned that, because section 304(f)(2)(F) ―concerns nonpoint 
sources‖ of pollutants, including flow diversion and water movements, Congress must not have 
intended water transfers to fall under ―point source‖ discharges regulated by the NPDES 
program. See NPDES Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,702 (citing S. Fla. Water Mgmt. 
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 106 (2004)). Ironically though, water can 
only be artificially transferred or diverted through point source conveyances, such as dams and 
flow diversion facilities, and courts have found that section 304(f)(2)(F) does not explicitly 
exempt nonpoint sources if they also fall within the definition of point source. See infra note 
105 and accompanying text. As a result, EPA‘s final interpretation seems to, in effect, equate 
non-point source ―concerns‖ of section 304(f)(2)(F) as exemptions for point source discharges 
falling within the ―concerns,‖ contrary to what courts have concluded.  
 82. For a discussion of the balance Congress sought to achieve between the state‘s right to 
allocate water and the federal government‘s authority to regulate water quality under the CWA, 
see Klein, supra note 66, at 1017–20.  
 83. NPDES Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,702–05. 
 84. Id. For a discussion of effluent limitations, see supra note 30. 
 85. NPDES Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,703 (citing CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., Serial No. 95-14, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, at 532 
(1978)).  
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discusses water flow management activities in the context of the 
nonpoint source program only,‖ pointing to section 304(f), where a 
House Committee Report ―specifically mentioned water flow 
management as an area where EPA would provide technical guidance 
to States for their nonpoint source programs, rather than an area to be 
regulated [by the NPDES program] under section 402‖ of the Act.86  
As a result of its interpretation of the language, structure, and 
legislative history of these limited sections of the CWA, EPA 
concluded that ―Congress generally did not intend to subject water 
transfers to the NPDES program.‖87  
V. A CRITIQUE OF EPA‘S RATIONALE 
Case law, legislative history, and statutory structure of the CWA 
and NPDES permitting provisions suggest that EPA‘s interpretation 
of ―addition‖ is unreasonable, and should not be given deference by 
courts.  
A. Case Law 
As mentioned in Part III, the First Circuit in Dubois and the 
Second Circuit in Catskills held that water transfers required an 
NPDES permit.
88
 The Dubois court examined the legislative history 
of the Act, and concluded that Congress could not have intended to 
allow water transfers through a point source without considering the 
water quality effects of such transfers.
89
 The Catskills court similarly 
examined the Act‘s legislative history and concluded that the 
―ordinary meaning‖ of the term ―addition‖ would provide enough 
basis to reject a unitary waters theory approach like the one espoused 
by the Final Rule.
90
 The Catskills court found the unitary waters 
theory approach inconsistent with the goals of the CWA because it 
―would mean that movement of water from one discrete water body 
 
 86. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 109 (1972)).  
 87. Id. 
 88. See supra notes 52–64 and accompanying text. 
 89. Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273, 1297–98 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 90. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 273 F.3d 481, 
493 (2d Cir. 2001).  
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to another would not be an addition even if it involved a transfer of 
water from a water body contaminated with myriad pollutants to a 
pristine water body containing few or no pollutants.‖91 Finally, both 
cases accurately distinguished Gorsuch and Consumers Power as 
cases that involved the accumulation of the same water or the 
movement of water within the same water body.
92
 In Gorsuch and 
Consumers Power, there was no concern that the normal directional 
flow was being subverted or that the waters were materially distinct 
from one another.
93
  
Additionally, courts have contradicted EPA‘s interpretations of 
sections 101(g) and 510(2) of the Act. In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson 
County v. Washington State Department of Ecology,
94
 the Court 
stated that ―Sections 101(g) and 510(2) preserve the authority of each 
State to allocate water quantity as between users; they do not limit the 
scope of water pollution controls that may be imposed on users who 
have obtained, pursuant to state law, a water allocation.‖95 In United 
States v. Akers,
96
 the Ninth Circuit looked at the same statutory 
provisions and concluded that ―[a] fair reading of the statute as a 
whole makes clear that, where both the state‘s interest in allocating 
water and the federal government's interest in protecting the 
environment are implicated, Congress intended an 
accommodation.‖97 Further, ―[s]uch accommodations are best 
reached in the individual permit process.‖98 Based on these court 
opinions, it appears that EPA overstated the dichotomy between 
federal water quality protection and preservation of states' water 
rights over issues of allocation.  
 
 91. Id. at 493. 
 92. See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text. 
 94. 511 U.S. 700, 720 (1994). 
 95. Id. at 720. 
 96. 785 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 
F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1985)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
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B. Legislative History and Statutory Structure 
Additionally, legislative history does not support EPA‘s 
interpretation. Although section 101(g) does concern water 
allocation, it was not intended to take precedence over legitimate and 
necessary water quality considerations. At the time of the CWA and 
its subsequent amendments, many western states were concerned 
about the federal government‘s intrusion into water transfers insofar 
as it related to the quantity of water already allocated to states.
99
 
Water was—and continues to be—a valuable natural resource in the 
western states and most had developed a water allocation system 
based on the prior appropriation doctrine.
100
 Because of the growing 
demand and resulting scarcity of water, many western states declared 
themselves the owners of their waters in trust for their citizens. In this 
role, the states adopted formal administrative permit procedures 
designed to consolidate historic water rights, provide for the transfer 
and creation of future rights, and enforce such rights.
101
 However, 
even though states developed their own regulatory schemes 
governing issues of water quantity and allocation, Congress 
proceeded apace to regulate all other aspects of water, like water 
 
 99. See S. Env‘t & Pub. Works Subcomm. Hearings on Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1977, Part 4, June 13, 1977, at 243–64 (testimony of Federal agency and 
FWPCA failure to equitably allocate water resources among competing users in Wyoming); 
COMM. ON WESTERN WATER MGMT., NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE 
WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 23–25 (1992) (noting the significance of 
water transfers in the West); GERALD D. NASH, THE AMERICAN WEST IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN URBAN OASIS 292 (1973).  
 100. See Ray Huffaker, Ari Michelsen & Joel Hamilton, The Uneasy Hierarchy of Federal 
and State Water Laws and Policies, WATER RESOURCES UPDATE, Jan. 2001, at 1, 3–10, 
available at http://www.ucowr. org/updates/pdf/V118_A2.pdf. The prior appropriation doctrine 
allocated surface water resources on a ―first in time, first in right‖ basis without restriction to a 
specified geographic area. Id. In contrast, eastern states adopted a riparian rights system that 
allocated water based on the waters‘ location in relation to the owned land. See Riparian Water 
Rights—Understanding Eastern U.S. Water Law, WATER COLO. BLOG (June 21, 2009, 11:58 
AM), http://www.water colorado.com/riparian-water-rights-understanding-eastern-us-water-
law/. For a comparative historical description of prior appropriation and riparian water rights 
schema, see JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 117–52, 268–
327 (2004).  
 101. Charles T. DuMars & A. Dan Tarlock, New Challenges to State Water Allocation 
Sovereignty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 331, 332 (1989), available at http://www.nationalaglaw 
center.org/assets/bibarticles/dumarstarlock_challenges.pdf. 
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quality, as water pollution became increasingly serious all over the 
country, including the West.
102
  
Unsurprisingly, due to the historical problem relating to western 
water scarcity, the drafters of § 101(g) in the 1977 Amendments to 
the CWA were careful to balance the need to reduce and eliminate 
water pollution with the need to preserve the states‘ longstanding 
water allocation priorities.
103
 One of the drafters, Senator Malcolm 
Wallop of Wyoming, stated that § 101(g) was not intended to take 
precedence over legitimate and necessary water quality 
considerations, but rather it was designed to protect the state‘s 
historic rights to establish priority of usage and ―from mischievous 
abrogation by those who would use an act, designed solely to protect 
water quality and wetlands, for other purposes.‖ 104 Accordingly, even 
though EPA correctly concluded that section 101(g) was intended by 
Congress to preserve the states‘ right over their historic allocation of 
water within their boundaries, EPA incorrectly concluded that water 
allocation should take precedence over all water quality 
considerations.  
EPA also incorrectly concluded the Congressional intent of 
§ 510(2). The Senate Committee Report stated that, ―[t]his section of 
the Act retains the right of any State or locality to adopt or enforce 
effluent standards or limitations, or any other requirement, respecting 
control or abatement of a water pollution more stringent than those 
required or established under this Act.‖105 Therefore, section 510(2) 
does not support the EPA‘s contention that Congress intended to 
leave complete oversight of water transfers to water resource 
management agencies and state non-NPDES authorities, but rather 
supports the contention that states may set more stringent, but not 
lower, pollution standards than the federal floor.  
 
 102. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 66, at 828–29; NASH, supra note 99, at 288–95. 
 103. Colangelo, supra note 21, at 115 n.45 (citing Nichols, supra note 20, at 119, 120).  
 104. 123 CONG. REC. 39,211–12 (1977) (statement of Sen. Wallop), reprinted in CWA77 
Leg. Hist. 14 (LEXIS). Senator Wallop explained that the requirements of section 402 and 404 
permits, for instance, may incidentally affect individual water rights, but that it was not the 
purpose of the amendment to prohibit those incidental effects so long as those effects were 
prompted by legitimate and necessary water quality considerations. Id. at 39,112. 
 105. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 85 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3751; see 
also S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 106 (2004).  
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Furthermore, although EPA correctly interprets section 304(f) to 
reflect an understanding by Congress that water movement could 
result in pollution, it does not follow that such pollution must be 
managed by states under their nonpoint source program authorities 
rather than by the NPDES program. The water movement activities 
listed in 304(f) may still be subject to the NPDES program if such 
water movement activities are emitted from a discernible conveyance 
or point source.
106
  
Additionally, even if most water transfers are not like effluent 
discharges in municipal, industrial, or commercial operation, the 
NPDES permit program, under § 302 of the CWA, shows an intent 
by Congress to regulate water pollution that may not be susceptible to 
effluent limitations and are better regulated by ―alternative effluent 
control strategies.‖107 Moreover, Congress sought to overcome the 
weaknesses of the 1899 Refuse Act, which only applied a permit 
requirement to industrial polluters, by creating the NPDES permit 
program and defining ―pollutants‖ broadly, such that the permit 
program would apply not only to industrial dischargers, but to all 
dischargers.  
Finally, the unitary waters theory espoused by the Final Rule 
ignores the CWA‘s treatment of ―dredged material‖ and ―dredged 
spoil‖ in section 404 of the CWA, which applies the same statutory 
definition of ―addition‖ as in the NPDES program under section 402 
of the CWA.
108
 The very nature of dredged spoil and dredged 
material is their obligation within the waters of the United States.
109
 
Thus, any discharge of dredged material inherently involves moving 
 
 106. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
section 304(f) lists activities that ―may involve discharges from both point and nonpoint 
sources, and those from point sources are subject to regulation‖); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. 
Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 373 
(1979).  
 107. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 108. CWA section 301(a) prohibits the ―discharge of any pollutant‖ without a permit, with 
section 502(6) defining ―pollutant‖ to include ―dredged spoil,‖ and section 502(12) defining 
―discharge of a pollutant‖ as ―any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source.‖ CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006); CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) 
(2006).  
 109. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2010) (EPA regulation defines ―dredged material‖ as ―material that 
is excavated or dredged from waters of the United States‖); accord 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (Corps 
of Engineers regulation). 
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material that originated in United States waters, even if it does not 
introduce material to those waters from an external source.
110
 Federal 
appellate courts have found that simply relocating dredged or fill 
material within a single water body constitutes an ―addition.‖111 As a 
result, if the mere relocation of dredged materials mandates a Clean 
Water Act permit, so does a mere relocation or transfer of pollutants 
from one water body to another under section 402 of the CWA.
112
  
VI. RECOMMENDATION 
In light of previous case law, legislative history, and the Supreme 
Court‘s dictum in Miccosukee, EPA‘s interpretation of ―addition‖ in 
the Final Rule is unreasonable and inconsistent with the delicate 
balance between environmental concerns and state sovereignty 
concerns Congress sought to resolve when it enacted the CWA and 
its subsequent amendments. EPA should have applied the 
―meaningfully distinct‖ test in determining what water transfers 
constitute an ―addition‖ under the NPDES program, rather than 
categorically exempting all water transfers from the program. This 
―meaningfully distinct‖ test should distinguish water transfers that do 
not significantly alter the biological, chemical, and physical structure 
of the receiving water body from water transfers that do.  
 
 110. According to the sponsor of the floor amendment that first proposed assigning the 
Corps permitting authority over dredged material discharge, such discharge involves ―moving 
spoil material from one place in the waterway to another, without the interjection of new 
pollutants.‖ 117 CONG. REC. 38,854 (1971) (statement of Sen. Ellender); accord id. at 38,853 
(―The disposal of dredged material does not involve the introduction of new pollutants; it 
merely moves the material from one location to another.‖) (emphasis added). 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (relocation of dredged 
material from a ditch to the edge of the ditch constituted an ―addition‖); Nat‘l Mining Ass‘n v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1403–05 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that ―incidental 
fallback,‖ which occurs when dredged material is returned ―virtually to the spot from which it 
came,‖ does not constitute an ―addition‖); United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1241–43 
(7th Cir. 1985) (§ 404 permit required for use of earthmoving equipment to spread soil around 
wetlands); Avoyelles Sportsmen‘s League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983). However, 
the court in Nat’l Mining Ass’n confirmed that relocation of dredged material to a different 
spot—even within the same water body—can constitute an ―addition‖ and, thus, a discharge. 
Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 145 F.2d at 1403–05.  
 112. Based on the similarity of the language used to define ―addition‖ in sections 404 and 
402, Congress may have likely intended that the term ―addition‖ as it applies to dredged 
materials has an application similar to the term ―addition‖ as it applies to water transfers, where 
pollutants are relocated or transferred from one water body to another water body.  
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While EPA‘s preliminary analysis of the ―meaningfully distinct‖ 
test is useful, it is overly complicated. EPA‘s two-part test misapplies 
grammatical construction because the adjective ―meaningfully‖ 
modifies ―distinct,‖ and so whether a water source is ―meaningfully 
distinct‖ should not have to meet a two prong analysis, such that the 
first prong requires a determination of whether a water is ―distinct.‖ 
The question really is whether the water meets the threshold level of 
being "meaningfully distinct," not that it must be "distinct" in the first 
place.  
A more useful way in applying Miccosukee‘s ―meaningfully 
distinct‖ test should take into account a multitude of factors such as 
the ones considered in Pennsylvania‘s Policy Guide.113 Rather than 
rely on a simple formulation such as hydrological connectivity,
114
 the 
test should consider: the flow direction (upstream vs. downstream); 
the water quality standards between the receiving and transferring 
waters; the likely impacts to vegetative and aquatic life in the 
receiving water body; and any potential mitigation measures that may 
limit the impact in a cost-effective manner. Despite the fear that 
permits will be required for every instance of a water transfer, the 
Supreme Court has previously noted that while ―permitting authority 
is necessary to protect water quality,‖ regulatory costs may be 
alleviated by the use of general permits, rather than individual 
NPDES permits.
115
  
CONCLUSION 
The interpretation of ―addition‖ by EPA under the NPDES Water 
Transfers Rule is unreasonable. Although the term ―addition‖ is 
ambiguous under a plain reading of the statute, EPA incorrectly 
characterized the legislative intent in the CWA sections they cited. 
 
 113. See POLICY GUIDE, supra note 41. 
 114. In Dubois, the court rejected the Forest Service‘s ―hydrological connectedness‖ 
proposal because it ignored the directional flow of the water. Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273, 
1298 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 115. Bettina Boxall, Water Pumping Case May Stem Flows in West, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2003, at B5 (referring to the amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court by Colorado‘s attorney 
general); see also Brief for Former Adm‘r Carol M. Browner et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at *3, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 
2003 WL 22793539. 
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An interpretation that would best achieve the legislative intent of the 
CWA and the NPDES permit program should define ―addition‖ as 
any discharge from a point source from one ―meaningfully distinct‖ 
waters of the United States to another ―meaningfully distinct‖ waters 
of the United States. Concededly, determining what waters are 
meaningfully distinct may not be as streamlined as EPA‘s categorical 
exemption of water transfers from the NPDES permitting 
requirements, but this approach better effectuates the delicate balance 
between environmental concerns and state sovereignty concerns 
Congress sought to resolve when it enacted the CWA and its 
amendments. 
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